INTRODUCTION
Modern company law is at a fork in the road: 1 the choice between entity principles, embodied by the traditional doctrines of corporate personality and limited liability, and enterprise principles, characterised by the treating of a parent and its subsidiary companies as one business enterprise. This paper will present the case for the adoption of enterprise principles at the intersection of corporate groups and torts, that is, treating a parent and subsidiary as a single enterprise for the purposes of compensating victims of a subsidiary's torts.
The focus of this paper will be on what will be termed the 'risky business' scenario, where a company incorporates a subsidiary that it wholly owns for the purposes of carrying on a dangerous activities and shielding itself from liability. In this scenario the subsidiary is typically undercapitalised in relation to the gravity of the risk it takes, resulting in the non-or under-compensation of tort victims. Thus the social costs of the activities are shifted away from the business conducting them.
2 This situation was succinctly summarised by Justice Templeman:
A parent company may spawn a number of subsidiary companies… If one of the subsidiary companies… turns out to be the runt of the litter and declines into insolvency… the parent company and the other subsidiary companies may prosper… without any liability for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary.

3
A brief history of limited liability and corporate groups will be offered and their relationship with each other, and with the law of torts, will be discussed. The application of limited liability to corporate groups and torts will be criticised and the case for enterprise liability will be made. In the latter part of the paper, some potential problems for enterprise liability will be considered and the bases for finding two or more companies to be a unified enterprise will be assessed. Finally, some factors for a test for enterprise liability will be suggested.
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS (a) Limited liability
One especially enthusiastic commentator lauded limited liability as the 'greatest single invention of modern times', stating, 'even steam and electricity are far less important.' 4 Others have been less exuberant in their praise, 5 but the importance of limited liability generally seems beyond dispute: it has undoubtedly encouraged the accumulation of capital for enterprise on a scale unimaginable without it.
While its importance is seldom doubted, the exact timing of its appearance on the scene of corporate law in the UK is difficult to pinpoint.
6 Certainly, by the second half of the 17 th century, people were citing limited liability as a motive for incorporation, 7 'most charters were silent [on the matter], and it had become accepted increasingly that in the absence of charter provision, shareholders were not directly liable'.
8 The Attorney-General in 1784, stated that the 'individuals who may compose the corporation would not be liable in their private characters'. 9 The Joint Stock Companies Registration Act 1844 provided for unlimited liability, but this proved unworkable and was replaced shortly afterwards.
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The widespread acceptance of limited liability emerged from railway companies, where shares were widely dispersed, management and shareholdings were separate, and tortuous liability of individual shareholders could not be avoided: acceptance of limited liability for the railways 'foreshadowed the ultimate acceptance of limited liability generally '. 11 In 1855, Parliament enacted the Limited Liability Act and limited liability was 'definitively accepted in English law'. 12 The dominance of limited liability was affirmed by the seminal Salomon case, 13 where the Court confirmed that all a party need do to attract the protection of limited liability is comply with the statutory requirements for company registration, rejecting any purposive approach, or any limitation on the strict wording of the Act.
(b) Corporate groups
14
Whereas limited liability was a deliberate decision taken due to commercial pressures, 15 corporate groups seem to have emerged almost by accident. The Companies Act 1862 16 provided for incorporation, giving companies the powers specified in their memorandum of association, including, if specified, the power to acquire shares in another company. The statute did not specifically contemplate this possibility and the Courts, taking a literal approach to the statute similar to that taken in Salomon, applied the ultra vires doctrine: a company could purchase shares in another company so long as it was authorised by its memorandum.
17
From these haphazard beginnings, the prominence of corporate groups has ballooned. In Britain, the top 50 companies have an average of over 200 subsidiaries 18 and corporate groups are now 'conduct of the great bulk of the economic activity of the industrialized world'.
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LIMITED LIABILITY, CORPORATE GROUPS AND TORT VICTIMS
The power to purchase shares was given to companies, apparently without awareness of the consequence, which was the imposition of two layers of limited liability: the original layer, protecting the ultimate investors in a company from claims against that company, and a new layer, protecting a parent company from liability from a claim against its subsidiary. Likewise the subsequent application of limited liability to corporate groups was ill considered, and a fundamental principle has been accepted, 'apparently without consideration of whether such acceptance was sound '. 20 Just as corporate law has not paid due attention to corporate groups and limited liability, tort victims have been ill considered. When limited liability was gaining credence, the problems associated with applying the 9 Kenyon, Case and Opinion of January 29, 1784, Boulton and Watt MSS, Birmingham Collection, Assay Office, cited in DuBois, n 7, 95-96. 10 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 583. Nevertheless, nearly 1000 unlimited companies were registered under the Act until it was replaced by the Limited Liability Act 1855. 17 Making some attempt to find authority for the practice in the statute, the Courts were partially persuaded by the fact that corporations were mentioned in the definition of 'persons', who could become members of a company. In re Barned's Banking Company (1867) Tricker, Corporate Governance (Oxford: OUP, 1984 ) ch 3. Given that this calculation was performed in 1981, it is likely that the number would be much higher now. BP, to take an extreme example, owned, in 1984, between 1200 to 1300 subsidiaries. Hadden, 'Inside Corporate Groups' (1984) 12 Intl J of the Sociology of L 271, 273. 19 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 603. 20 Ibid 610. doctrine to tort creditors had not been considered. 21 Indeed, it was not thought that the doctrine would entail any more than simply protecting investors in the company from the unsatisfied claims of the creditors.
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The leading UK case on the law of corporate personality and the limited liability of groups is Adams v Cape.
23 Cape Industries headed a group of companies involved in asbestos mining and marketing. Asbestos mined by one subsidiary in South Africa was used, by another subsidiary, in a Texas factory resulting in 668 personal injury claims. In negating to enforce the Texas judgment for 206 claimants 24 against the UK parent of the group, the Court of Appeal refused to break with the traditional separate entity approach. The Court also refused to 'pierce the veil', further distancing tort victims from compensation. 25 Thus, the Court of Appeal vigorously reaffirmed the strict application of limited liability to corporate groups, rejecting the many arguments made for imposing liability on a subsidiary company.
Given that the approach taken to corporate groups generally has been to squeeze them into the pre-existing body of company law, and that, at the same time, consideration has not been given to tort victims in the application of limited liability, there is clearly a need for thorough a re-examination of this area of the law.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPLYING LIMITED LIABILITY TO A WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY COMPANY (a) Inapplicability of justifications for limited liability
The key argument against applying limited liability in the context of corporate groups is that the arguments in favour of limited liability generally do not apply in the present context. The law was not designed with complex group structures in mind and its application in such circumstances is 'anachronistic and dysfunctional'. 26 The justifications for limited liability generally hinge on the characterisation of the shareholders as passive investors who have no interest in the business other than that their money is invested in it. However, in the 'risky business' case of subsidiary incorporation, the parent corporation is not such an 'absentee owner ', 27 but is in fact the driving force behind the subsidiary. Thus, many of the advantages of limited liability that apply to absentee investors do not hold in the present situation.
The numerous advantages of, or justifications for, limited liability generally are well expounded, and many commentators have helpfully and comprehensively identified them. 28 These justifications are considered briefly below in relation to corporate groups.
(1) Eradicates high collection costs associated with collecting from numerous dispersed shareholders Where there are many shareholders, this argument holds because the cost of collecting from numerous ultimate investors would consume the benefit of so collecting, 29 however this argument will not apply to a wholly owned subsidiary, where collection will only be sought from one party. 30 Indeed, even where two or more different companies own another company, it is still likely that collection costs will not be so great so as to negate any benefit gained. 21 Leeborn, 'Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors' (1991) Leeborn, n 21, 1612. (2) Increasing development of very large enterprises When speaking of one company only, there is a need to encourage investment from a wide range of sources as ' [l] arge scale enterprise involves enormous risks that dwarf the financial resources of all but the wealthiest shareholders'. 31 Clearly, in the group context, this is not relevant, as the only, or the dominant, shareholder is the parent company. The parent company has the ability to diversify its portfolio and spread its risks in a way that ordinary investors cannot, 32 and therefore does not require the protection of limited liability to develop its businesses further.
(3) Avoidance of increased agency costs Jensen and Meckling 33 suggest that, in the absence of limited liability, activities prejudicial to the shareholders, undertaken due to 'divergence between [the manager's] interest and those of the outside shareholders', 34 can be limited by monitoring. However, in the group context, the need to establish congruence of these interests does not arise because the manager and shareholder is the parent company, so these interests will necessarily be congruent.
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(4) Avoidance of the impairment of capital market efficiency This argument is advanced because limited liability enhances the ready transferability and uniform pricing of shares, 36 but, in the case of the wholly owned subsidiary, no adverse affect on the public market can occur as no such market exists.
(5) Encouragement of risk taking
This is probably the most significant factor in the present context. 38 The argument that limited liability encourages risk taking remains applicable because, as noted, a holding company generally wishes to take advantage of the possibility of externalising risk using a subsidiary. There is, however, a danger, which appears to have come to pass in cases such as Adams, that this can encourage risk that is excessive because 'owners who engage in excessively risky activities are protected from liability'. 39 Muscat qualifies his exposition of this justification, referring to encouraging only 'socially desirable high risk projects ', 40 however, while this qualification may be a good addition in theory, in practice it seems unlikely that corporate groups are predisposed to conducting only socially-desirable projects. On the contrary, a holding company is likely to seek profit maximisation, which may take place using subsidiaries that are not necessarily engaged in socially desirable activities. 41 In addition, the law does not state that only such projects must be pursued and any attempt to so limit a company would inevitably run into a plethora of issues, not least determining what is, in fact, 'socially desirable'. The key difference between a tort creditor and a voluntary creditor in the present context is that the latter can evaluate the risk associated with the business activity in advance, and consequently can charge a commensurate rate of interest 42 or seek other forms of security. 43 By contrast, a potential tort creditor cannot so readily account for the risk that his claim will go unsatisfied. 44 The charging of interest commensurate with risk incentivises the company to reduce their risk in relation to those activities, 45 whereas no such incentive exists with regard to potential tort creditors, Finally, the inability of potential tort creditors to foresee the harm means it is difficult for them to contract out of limited liability. 46 In any case it seems unlikely that potential tort creditors will have the bargaining power to do this.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST APPLYING LIMITED LIABILITY FOR TORTS
(c) Conflicts with the aims of tort
The core aims of tort law include the compensation of victims, the imposition of the costs of an activity on the activity itself and discouraging negligent or intentionally harmful activities, 47 each of which is patently flouted by the application of limited liability.
Firstly, a parent company is essentially able to dictate how much compensation will be paid to tort victims because where a company undercapitalises a subsidiary which is subsequently required to compensate tort victims, those victims will not receive adequate compensation.
48 Secondly, it is not the activity itself that bears its costs, but society as a whole, as the application of limited liability to torts allows business to create externalities without paying for them. Thirdly, the justification that limited liability encourages risk taking is at odds with the need to discourage negligent or harmful activity. This is especially true in the group context, where a subsidiary may be incorporated solely for the purpose of engaging in highly risky activities. Thus, limited liability makes a mockery of deterrence.
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THE FAILURE OF LIMITED LIABILITY AT THE INTERSECTION OF GROUPS AND TORTS
As will be obvious from the foregoing, the present law fails to adequately address two issues: 50 corporate groups and tort creditors. As to the former, the application of limited liability to wholly owned subsidiaries is misguided. Limited liability arose not as an 'inevitable conceptual derivation from the separate nature of the entity', 51 but to procure advantages that do not occur in the context of a wholly owned subsidiary. As to the latter, limited liability prejudices tort victims and conflicts with the aims of tort law.
While either of these issues in isolation may suggest the need for a re-evaluation of the law, the need is even more pronounced where the two issues intersect, as in the 'risky business' scenario. In such a situation the 'normative and economic realities necessitate a different regime of legal inquiry'.
52
THE CASE FOR ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
The different regime of legal inquiry advocated herein is that of enterprise analysis, defined broadly as treating a parent and subsidiary as one company. Specifically, for present purposes, it refers to the holding of both a subsidiary and its parent liable for torts on the basis that they are part of the same enterprise. 42 Thompson, 'Unpacking Limited Liability', n 29, 36.
43 See Stone, n 22, 68. 44 Ibid. 45 Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure, n 28, 51. 46 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 617. The New South Wales Supreme Court in Australia has recognised this: see James Hardie & Co. Pty. Ltd. (1989) 7 ACLC 841, 863. 47 Ibid 661-662. 48 See In Re Southard, n 3. 49 Stone, n 22, 65. 50 These are not the only two problems, but are certainly two key problems with the present state of the law. Other commentators have recognised this. See, e.g., Thompson, 'Piercing the Veil', n 42, 379; Dearborn, 'Enterprise Liability: Reviewing and Revitalizing Liability for Corporate Groups (2009) 97 California L Rev 195; Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 4, 576 . 51 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 585.
There are differing conceptions as to the bases for enterprise theory, which will become apparent as existing examples of enterprise law are discussed. For instance, Dearborn sees enterprise liability as 'seek[ing] to marry legal and economic realities' 53 while Antunes suggests that the control exerted by a parent company over a subsidiary is the proper foundational basis. 54 Aronofsky envisages a mixed approach, citing '[t]he degree of centralized control and economic integration, organization, market, and public identification as a unitary company' as factors to be considered.
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It should be noted at the outset that enterprise analysis is different from 'piercing the veil'. It does not attempt to look behind or through the corporate form, but instead goes beyond the corporate form entirely. Veil piercing is 'vertical', holding shareholders personally liable, whereas enterprise liability provides a 'horizontal form of liability' allowing the entire business enterprise to be held liable. 56 Another key difference is that while veil piercing focuses on the illegitimate use of the corporate form, enterprise liability actually utilises the parent-subsidiary relationship to allocate liability. 57 Rather than creating sporadic and incomplete exceptions to the corporate form, enterprise analysis tackles the problem at the 'critical juncture '. 58 It is also worth noting at this point that solutions other than enterprise liability have been suggested as a means for redressing the injustice caused to tort creditors under a limited liability rule. For example insurance and price adjustments have been advocated. 59 However, the lack of availability of such insurance, market imperfections and governmental intervention make insurance ineffective in practice. 60 In any case, insurance could not eradicate the risk to tort claimants associated with unforeseeable harm. 61 Even where the harm is foreseeable, companies may fail to take out adequate insurance, the insurance company may be unable to pay a tort judgment 62 or the tort in question may not be covered by the policy. 63 Price adjustments are also ineffectual as they simply shift the problem around without actually dealing with it, continuing to move the risk away from its creator and providing little incentive for risk reduction at the outset.
Posner suggests that an alternative to insurance would be requiring companies engaging in dangerous activities to post a bond 'equal to the highest reasonable estimate of the probable extent of tort liability'.
64
This does not seem to be any better a solution than insurance because unforeseeable or unforeseen risk cannot, by its nature, be reasonably estimated in advance.
In any case, these solutions are focused on addressing the problem of under-compensation of tort victims alone and do not take account of the fact that the application of limited liability to groups was also illconsidered. Failing to take this into account, these solutions seek to maintain limited liability as the general rule. As has been seen, the arguments for limited liability do not apply to the context under discussion, so there is no need to strive to maintain it. In fact, abolition of limited liability in this context is a return to 'basic tenets of limited liability', which was created to protect human beings, rather than parent 53 Ibid 210 . 54 German, and EEC law: an international and comparative perspective (Boston: Kluwer Law, 1994) . 55 Ibid. companies. 65 Another possible solution is the strategy of using the ordinary rules of tort law to claim that the parent itself is primarily liable. This possibility seems to be almost all that is left for under-compensated tort claimants post-Adams v Cape, and may therefore at least offer some small hope of recompense absent the change in the law advocated here. In Lubbe v Cape 66 the claimants, having failed to get relief in Adams v Cape, sought to make use of this potential. Issues arise as to the difficulty of proving both a duty of care and causation: as the Court itself noted, to 'investigate, prepare and resolve these issues, in relation to each of the plaintiffs, would plainly involve a careful, detailed and cumbersome factual inquiry and, at least potentially, a very large body of expert evidence'. 67 The use of tort law in this way is plagued, as is the present law, by its deficient foundations: rather than offering reform tailored to the modern concept of corporate groups, this strategy attempts to manipulate the law to fit the modern context into rules that were never intended for it.
Antunes, Liability of Corporate Groups: Autonomy and Control in Parent-Subsidiary Relationships in US,
Enterprise liability, by contrast to these suggestions, cures both of the identified defects of the current law and 'simply makes more normative and economic sense'. 68 Enterprise liability is more in tune with reality and provides a considered approach to the specific situation. As corporate groups themselves generally disregard the separate legal entities of their constituent companies, enterprise liability reflects the economic reality of modern business and accords with companies' own internal workings. 69 With regard the unfairness to tort victims, enterprise liability is also fairer on tort victims and more in line with the aims tort. The risk of hazardous activities is reallocated; companies either adequately insure or capitalise their subsidiaries, or are deterred from carrying out hazardous activities.
ENTERPRISE ANALYSIS IN PRACTICE
Identifying legal systems that have experimented with enterprise liability will give a contextual background to enterprise liability, provide the basis for refutation of the arguments against enterprise liability and will offer some insight as to how a test for enterprise liability may be constructed.
(a) Germany70
Germany has been termed the 'standard-setter' 71 for enterprise analysis and was the first country to comprehensively approach the problem presented by corporate groups. 72 German law defines two categories of group. The first, rarely used, 73 is the contractual corporate group, whereby a voluntary 'control agreement' is made between the parent and subsidiary, 74 pursuant to which 'the parent… exercise[s] far-reaching management powers over the subsidiary'. 75 The second is the de facto group, characterised by majority ownership of one company by another 76 and a centralised and homogenous management structure 77 in which both companies are operated as one enterprise. (1) . 76 This creates a presumption that the subsidiary is not independent. German Law on Stock Corporations, n 74, ss.16(1) and 17(2). 77 German Law on Stock Corporations §18(1).
Some important points must be made. The German legislature sought to correct a different problem to the one under discussion here. Their aim was to correct a perceived conflict between the interests of a subsidiary and its parent, who would 'presumably seek to maximize its own shareholders' welfare at the potential expense of the subsidiary's minority or passive shareholders and creditors'. 79 As a result, the law's focus is on compensation of a subsidiary by a parent for loss caused to the subsidiary and the law therefore does little to assist a tort victim trying to recover from a parent company.
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Also of note is that the law applies only to joint stock corporations, generally utilised by large public corporations, 81 whereas the most commonly used form of company in Germany is the limited liability company (LLC). 82 The judiciary actively extended the law to analogous situations not originally covered by the strict wording of the Act. 83 The Courts extended enterprise liability to LLCs 84 and other situations 85 to the point where it was widely understood that enterprise analysis was more generally applicable. 86 However, the court recently changed direction in this regard in the Bremer Vulkan case, 87 severely curtailing the development of the doctrine. 88 This 'complete abandonment' of the application of group liability principles 89 has been lamented as hailing a return to a 'casuistic, largely unprincipled and fragmental approach'
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(b) German Law on Stock Corporations: progeny
Despite the retreat of the German Law, it has been 'more influential than any other… in spurring legal reform of the parent-subsidiary relationship', 91 and a number of countries have adopted laws influenced or inspired by Germany's example. 92 Brazil, for example, has adopted a mild form of enterprise analysis 93 that is broadly similar to the German law. 94 Unfortunately, it also follows the German law in not giving creditors a direct cause of action, based on the belief that 'experience shows that the creditor as a rule obtains protection via contractual agreement '. 95 This overlooks the fact, already identified, that tort creditors cannot contract out of limited liability, and so remain unprotected by a regime that does not allow them to bring a direct action. Portugal enacted similar provisions, 96 but they only apply where a company chooses to legally formalise its parent-subsidiary relationships. 97 Italy, in one sense, took a step forward from the German example by creating a direct cause of action 78 Reich-Graefe, n 70, 790. 79 Dearborn, n 50, 216 (citation omitted Antunes, n 54, [326] [327] against a parent company; 98 however, the cause of action applies only if the holding company causes damage through mismanagement of the subsidiary. 99 Overall, the Italian approach has been lamented as offering only piecemeal reforms, rather than an overarching system, 100 and is of doubtful significance in practice.
(c) EU
Most importantly for the UK, the EU has discussed enterprise liability. While it should be noted at the outset that these advances have not progressed as far as substantive law, its 'potential as a trendsetter' 102 justifies inclusion. The initial hope that the European Company Statute would include provisions on parent liability in the case of European Companies 103 was quelled by the exclusion of such provisions in the eventual statute.
104 Thus the remaining proposal of relevance here is the Ninth Directive on company groups.
105 Under the directive the parent would have been responsible for the liabilities of subsidiaries on the basis of unified management and control.
106 Unfortunately, the provisions have been lamented as being weakened in order to stem political opposition 107 and progression of the directive has, for the time being, halted. 108 The UK has been particularly vocal in its opposition to the Ninth Directive. 109 However, the fact that enterprise liability has been discussed, despite such opposition, shows that enterprise principles are slowly creeping into awareness at the early stages of EU law.
(d) UK
There was a brief flirtation with enterprise analysis in English law, starting with Lord Denning's 'single economic unit' argument in the DHN case. 110 The issue in DHN was whether a group of three companies could be treated as one enterprise for the purposes of receiving compensation for the compulsory purchase of the group's property. Noting that groups of companies are treated as one for many other purposes, Denning held that they should be treated as one concern for the purposes of compulsory purchase compensation.
111 Enterprise analysis, he thought, was particularly relevant where the subsidiary is wholly owned, or where a high level of control is exercised over it.
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Although originally pertaining to compulsory purchase compensation claims, the single economic unit argument started to seep into the law at a more general level. In Lewis Trusts 113 garments were being made in stages by different subsidiaries and May LJ suggested obiter that it was unnecessary to distinguish between them for the purposes of copyright infringement. In the US, Michigan has distinguished between a company as an investor, who exercises 'mere oversight of a subsidiary's business in a manner appropriate and consistent with the investment relationship', and a company that exercises 'actual participation and control over a subsidiary's functions and decisionmaking'. 119 Texas courts had enunciated a doctrine of 'single business enterprise'; 120 however, this was recently rejected by the Texas Supreme Court. 121 A landmark Louisiana case considered that '[i]f one corporation is wholly under the control of another, the fact that it is a separate entity does not relieve the latter from liability' 122 and enumerated eighteen separate factors for consideration. 123 Though the doctrine has garnered some judicial support, 124 it has also attracted academic criticism 125 and the case has not resulted in a 'widespread movement to embrace' the doctrine.
(f) India
By far the most extensive approach to enterprise liability has been taken by India. Firstly, in the wake of the Bhopal disaster, the Government assumed parens patriae responsibility for the resulting cases in the New York Courts, 127 arguing that a corporate group is not a set of distinct entities, but '[i]n reality… one entity, the monolithic [corporation]', 128 and that the group is in a better position to assume the risk of its activities than tort victims. 129 A year after the Bhopal disaster, the Supreme Court of India, in the Oleum Gas Leak case, 130 held that 'an enterprise [has a] duty to… ensure that no harm results… on account of [the] nature of [its] activity '131 and that if such harm does result, the enterprise as a whole should be liable.
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The court noted the fact, as discussed, that the tort victim is not best placed to bear the risk and social costs of the business 133 and that the 'enterprise alone has the resource[s] to discover and guard against hazards or dangers'. 134 The court posited that the permission to carry on a risky business must come with the responsibility for the externalities generated. 135 
(g) UN Norms
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The UN norms, 137 while applying only to activities involving some trans-national element, 138 and so not affecting wholly internal situations, articulate very high standards for businesses and adopt a real-world view of corporate groups. 139 The norms are yet to be adopted 140 and views differ as to the likelihood of their adoption in the future. 141 A vigorous debate about their effect has ensued, with some commentators arguing that they are 'legally binding', 142 while others assert that they are of 'marginal utility'. 143 At the very least, the significance of the surfacing of enterprise liability at the international level should not be underestimated 144 and represents a key event in its development.
TOWARD A TEST FOR ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
Creating a perfect test for applying enterprise liability would 'take a roomful of experts, legislators, and businesspeople', 145 and is therefore a task that is well beyond the scope of the modest exposition offered here. That said, the discussion of enterprise liability thus suggests that a number of issues would have to be addressed. This paper will expand on these issues in an attempt to make the first steps toward the creation of a test for enterprise liability.
Such a test would, broadly, have two parts: it must apply to torts and it must apply to a group enterprise. As a preliminary matter, a test for enterprise liability must deal with the problem presented by minority shareholders.
(a) Minority shareholders
Minority shareholders present a problem for enterprise liability because a parent company, wishing to make use of limited liability by incorporating a subsidiary to carry out risky activities, is likely, under a rule that applies enterprise liability where a subsidiary is wholly owned, to sell minority shareholdings in an attempt to circumvent the application of enterprise analysis and absolve themselves of liability. As companies have been accustomed to the limited liability, it seems likely that they will be at pains to maintain it. A rule simply applying enterprise liability where a subsidiary is wholly owned would be far too easily circumvented by transfer of shares, just as the Joint Stock Companies Registration Act 1844, which provided for unlimited liability, failed to maintain that liability in the face of circumvention efforts.
The introduction of minority shareholders reinvigorates some of the justifications for limited liability that were dismissed earlier in the case of wholly owned subsidiaries. For instance, if a company is not wholly owned by a single parent, there may well be a market where the publicly held shares are traded and therefore limited liability will facilitate the efficiency of the market. 147 Likewise, minority shareholders who would otherwise acquiesce in the management of the company may have to increase their involvement in the company's affairs or incur monitoring costs to ensure that their investment is not harmed by tort claims arising as a result of the majority shareholder's management. The need to keep agency and collection costs low would also need to be considered where minority shareholders are present.
The law could either see the prejudice caused to minority shareholders as a necessary and minor price to pay for better protection of tort victims, or construct a test that excludes minority shareholders, and makes only the parent company liable. Essentially the question is whether the benefit to the minority shareholders, and the public generally, outweighs the harm that would result to tort victims if limited liability was strictly applied. This is likely to be a matter of extent. For example, where a company is 99% owned by a parent company, the other 1% being held by independent absentee investors, it would seem absurd to suggest that the benefit accruing from a strict application of limited liability should outweigh the interests of innocent tort victims.
Fortunately, it seems that any test that looks beyond merely wholly owned subsidiaries will offer protection. This is because minority shareholders, by their nature, will not have sufficient control over the subsidiary to be considered the authors of the tort, 148 and nor will they be part of the economically unified enterprise of the parent and its subsidiary. Thus liability would not fall to them under either a control-based or economics based test.
(b) Part one: tort victims
A preliminary observation to be made with relation to the tort victims themselves is that they should have a direct cause of action as against a parent company. As already noted, existing implementations of enterprise liability, such as the German system, are entirely internal. This, whilst dealing with the objection that limited liability is ill-fitting for groups, leaves tort victims unprotected.
The precise scope of 'tort victims' under such a test needs to be discussed. Dearborn suggests that 'torts' in this context should be confined to 'mass torts, human rights disasters, and environmental harms'.
149 She offers three reasons for this, which must be considered in deciding whether enterprise liability should be limited in this way, in some other way, or not limited at all beyond requiring satisfaction of ordinary tort requirements.
Firstly she notes that confining enterprise liability to mass torts will appease the business community, who will inevitably be concerned that 'enterprise liability would cause the end of investment capitalism'. 150 The substance of this argument will be dealt with more fully below, however, in relation to the concerns of companies alluded to in this quote, it suffices to say that, while companies are very likely to oppose any measure that aims to increase their potential liability, it seems unlikely that such companies would truly think that the effects of enterprise liability, particularly only in the limited form under discussion, would be so far-reaching as to spell the end for capitalism.
Dearborn suggests that this limit on the definition of tort victims ensures that enterprise liability is 'merely a tool to check the most egregious and socially harmful of corporate behaviours'. 151 What is not clear is exactly why it is only these behaviours that should be checked. This would cause a lacuna between victims of the parent's torts and victims of the subsidiary's torts: while the former will be compensated for any tort, the latter would only be compensated where the tort that happened to befall him was of the most awful character. As the parent company in the 'risky business' scenario incorporates the subsidiary precisely for 147 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 624.
148 Though sufficient control could occur if a control-based test tied liability to a low shareholding, as is the case in US banking law. See The Bank Holding Company Act 1956 (12 U.S.C. §1841). 149 Ibid 255. 150 Ibid.
151 Ibid. the purposes of avoiding liability, it seems more logical to suggest that all victims of torts committed by the subsidiary in that situation should be included. Thus it would offer the tort victim the same protection he would have received had he been under the auspices of the parent company, had it not attempted to externalise the risks that came to fruition.
Furthermore, whereas allowing all tort claims makes for simple application, the confinement of 'torts' to mass torts, human rights disasters, and environmental harms adds a layer of difficulty in determining which tort victims are able to recover. Courts would have to answer difficult questions under a rule of enterprise liability where only victims of 'human rights disasters' could claim. For example, how many injuries or deaths are required to constitute a human rights disaster? Or is the gravity of harm, rather than the quantity, the defining factor? This formulation could cause a test to devolve into a numbers game, and would require the assessment of the relative gravity of harm suffered by tort victims. It is submitted that any harm caused as a result of deliberate externalisation of risk is unacceptable, and a more satisfactory test is one that treats the two businesses as one enterprise, causing the parent company to be liable for the torts of its subsidiary.
Secondly Dearborn makes the valid point that, in terms of controlling corporate behaviours, it is mass torts and the most serious torts that 'stand to harm the corporation from a public relations and economic standpoint'.
152 While this is true, it is submitted that allowing the parent to be held liable for all torts will further increase the corporate control effects of enterprise liability by increasing the number of torts the company can be liable for. In any case, it is arguable that the control of corporate behaviour should not be the only factor taken into account. As this paper argues, the aims of tort law should take precedence and the focus should be on the injustice caused by the inability of a subsidiary to adequately compensate tort victims. The goals of compensation and deterrence will be further served by making companies liable for all torts, and any test that excludes tort victims of the subsidiary, or results in their non-or undercompensation, seems inadequate.
Aside from the issue of defining tort victims, there are two other points of note to be made. Firstly, at least one commentator has suggested that corporate groups should be able to 'opt out' of enterprise liability.
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This is clearly antithetical to the arguments made in this paper, as an opt out provision would allow a parent company to easily preserve the limited liability that has been seen to be so problematic. It has been proposed that those companies choosing to opt out of enterprise liability could be identified by letters after their name, following the existing practice of using letters to identify the type of company the business registered as. 154 While this would be helpful to contractual creditors, tort victims cannot choose their tortfeasor and such an implementation of enterprise liability would potentially result in perverse outcomes; some victims being compensated by the parent and others receiving nothing.
Secondly, Dearborn suggests that the burden of proof should be on the parent company to disprove that their corporate group is an enterprise, once the claimant has satisfied a preliminary burden. 155 This, unlike the opt-out proposal, is in line with the need to adequately protect tort victims. As the company is in the best position to evidence its inner workings, the burden can only reasonably be on them to disprove their unity.
(c) Part two: enterprise
Part two of the test would need to focus on when exactly both a subsidiary and its parent will be held liable on the basis that they are part of the same enterprise. The different bases for holding that the companies are one enterprise is much discussed in the academic literature, and a number of bases can be seen in the examples of enterprise liability currently in existence. The test for enterprise liability must protect 'real' investors, that is those investors that activate the justifications for limited liability, while maintaining liability of a company that is, in reality part of the same enterprise. 152 Dearborn, n 50, 255. 153 Kluver, n 1, 781. While this suggestion is made in the context of discussing the difficulties of meeting the demands of creditors upon insolvent liquidation, there is no suggestion in the article that tort creditors would not be considered creditors for this purpose, or that an opt out would not apply to tort creditors. 154 Ibid.
(1) Control-based enterprise liability Basing a test for enterprise liability on the control exerted by the parent over the subsidiary is superficially appealing because it appears to offer simplicity. The major downside of this approach is that it may incentivise the deliberate decentralisation of management in order to make it appear that the subsidiary acts independently, thus allowing for easy circumvention, with no obvious way of determining when the decentralisation is improper. This decentralisation is problematic as the parent company allows the subsidiary to use its capital, while avoiding responsibility for torts arising out of that use.
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Decentralisation may therefore result in less oversight of the subsidiary's activities on the part of the parent and will seemingly increase the occurrences of torts, whereas it may actually be desirable to encourage strong central management in the hope of increasing oversight and preventing torts before they occur.
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Also in this category are rules that establish a presumption of control based on a share holding percentage; for instance, the German law establishes a presumption where a company holds a majority of shares in another company. This is, again, attractive due to its simplicity, but, unfortunately, along with this simplicity comes the risk that the reality of the situation will not be reflected accurately by the legal standard. A company that has a majority shareholding may not actually exercise any real control over a subsidiary where the group operates under decentralised management. This is even more pronounced where the presumption is activated by a low percentage. Likewise, where the presumption is only activated by a very high threshold, the legal standard risks excluding companies that are, in reality, a unified enterprise.
It may hypothetically be though that such problems could be ironed out by finding the optimal percentage ownership at which the presumption should be activated. There are, however, issues with this that cannot be resolved because, in reality, no such level exists: any set level causes the law to be rigid and unable to adapt to the many different types and forms of business.
In its favour, control-based enterprise liability does allow a bright line to be easily drawn between passive and active shareholders. The distinction between these two types of shareholder is crucial because, as was seen at the beginning of this paper, many justifications for limited liability apply in the case of the former, but not in the latter. This argument is forceful, but there is no reason why an economic conception of enterprise liability could draw the same line, as independent investors are clearly not a part of the same economic enterprise as the parent company majority shareholder.
(2) Economic or 'true' 159 enterprise liability
An economics-based test looks at the economic structure of the group in question. While this may at first appear to be less certain than the simple control test, it is argued here that such a basis would be preferential.
Firstly, an economics-oriented test is appealing because for the view of parent and subsidiary companies acting together as a unified economic unit, a corporate group, is 'generally an accurate one'. 160 This is in contrast to a control-based test, which may obscure the reality.
Secondly, whereas a control-based approach incentivises the decentralisation of management and therefore increases the chance that torts will occur, an economic approach would incentivise the parent to invest in preventing torts before they occur, as the liability for a subsidiary's torts will fall to them.
Thirdly, this approach would mitigate the problems with the rigidity and formalism of a control-based approach. A number of factors could be considered as part of the determination of whether two companies are one for the purposes of enterprise liability. This flexibility would be invaluable to legislators and the courts in drawing up and applying the test in a way that adequately places liability on groups that are, in reality, one company, whilst protecting minority shareholders and passive corporate shareholders.
157 158 See Stone, n 22. 159 Dearborn, n 50, 226. While it is acknowledged that the term 'true enterprise liability' is more fitting than 'economic enterprise liability', as some factors, such as public identification, are not strictly economic, the latter term is used here as it is the more common expression in the literature. 160 Strasser, n 126, 647. (3) Suggested factors for inclusion in an economic enterprise liability test
The following factors may be included in a test for enterprise liability, though drawing up an exhaustive list would likely be impossible: (1) whether the subsidiary was created, or acquired, for the purposes of furthering the economic aims of the parent, (3) whether the externalisation of risk plays a role in the utilisation of the subsidiary, (4) market and public identification of the group as a unified business.
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There are numerous real-life examples of cases where these factors could easily have been applied in practice, and allusion to some of these examples at this stage will aid understanding of how the envisaged rules of enterprise liability may apply. As to the first suggested factor, Adams v Cape provides an apt example. In that case it would have been clear to the court that, whatever the formal legal structure of the group, the subsidiary was incorporated to further the economic aims of the parent.
Determining whether the externalisation of risk was an element in the use of the subsidiary is an important factor, as in the 'risky business' scenario this is the main purpose of its creation. This may be a complex inquiry, however, there is no reason to think that determination of this factor is beyond the capacity of the courts. An example, though imperfect as the case involved contracting, rather than use of a subsidiary, 162 is the Trafigura case, which centred on a company that chartered a ship to dispose of toxic waste. While Trafigura claimed it had acted honestly and legitimately, internal emails came to light that would have informed a court that the company was purposefully externalising risk.
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The public identification of a group of companies as one may go some way to determining whether the group operates as one enterprise. If the group has held itself out as one unit to the extent that the public identify them as such, for instance, by using trademarks or franchising, 164 then there is an almost irresistible inference that the group operates as one economic unit. As a group benefits from holding itself out as one enterprise, it should be held to account as one enterprise where it causes torts. In contrast to the present law, this factor reflects the reality of modern corporate groups, which 'seldom, if ever, have qualms about disregarding separate legal identity when to do so would permit a maximization of profits for the company as a whole', 165 for instance, by holding itself out as one company to the public in order to make use of the value of the brand of one of the group members.
A pertinent example stems from the Unocal case. 166 Villagers living close to a pipeline under construction were gifted Unocal-branded items during construction in an attempt to find favour with them. 167 In this way, Unocal was able to hold itself out to be the company behind the construction, yet it distanced itself from the project in the formal legal structure. An analysis of public identification under an enterprise liability rule for torts could remedy this contradiction and ensure that a business cannot gain the benefits of identification as a unified enterprise without also accepting the responsibility for the actions of that enterprise.
This factor may, however, be a double-edged sword. A company may deliberately maintain a distance between itself and the subsidiary. For example, a company establishing a subsidiary to deal in asbestos may try to detach itself from that activity both in law and in the eyes of the public, due to the negative connotations or publicity that may be associated with it. In such a case, public identification is not likely to be a helpful factor as it may belie the true economic reality. So long as courts remain alert to the pitfalls of overemphasising one factor over others, this problem can be mitigated by ensuring that all factors, particularly those that may suggest economic unity, are considered. 161 Aronofsky, n 55. 162 This example is used here, despite this imperfection, as the precise details of the affair is irrelevant to the present point that evidence of the parent's intention to externalise risk may often be available. 163 Aronofsky, n 55, 33. 166 See Dearborn, n 50, 196. 167 Ibid.
The use of a factored test has been criticised. Presser contends that such an approach 'substitut[es] lists of factors for serious purposive analysis' 168 and Hamilton and Macey suggest that problems would arise due to poor weighting of factors and the encouragement of a mechanical approach. 169 It is submitted that a factored test is not a substitute purposive analysis, it offers guidance; a framework in which courts can assess the economic unity of the enterprise. There is little reason to think that the courts, using the factors as guides rather than touchstones, and bearing in mind the overarching question of whether or not there is an economically-unified enterprise, will attach inappropriately skewed weight to different factors, or that they will approach the question in a mechanical fashion. It is almost condescending to suggest that the courts, which regularly use guided frameworks to interpret broad concepts, would struggle to apply a factored test of enterprise liability.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
As with any proposal for reform, there will be detractors and arguments wielded against the implementation of enterprise liability at the intersection of corporate groups and torts. This part of the paper identifies some of the most common and most likely arguments against enterprise liability.
(a) Negative effects on the economy
One counterargument that must be carefully considered is that enterprise liability would harm the economy, and, more specifically, whether such harm outweighs the need to adequately address tort victims. Dearborn suggests 'Germany provides an empirical example of an industrialized country that has adopted a milder form of enterprise principles without disastrous results for domestic of international investment capitalism '. 170 Unfortunately, this observation does little to refute the argument. It surely would not be expected that the effects of a 'mild' form of enterprise principles would be 'disastrous'. As the practical impact of the law has been very small it is unsurprising that the economic consequences have been commensurately small.
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India, with its stronger form of enterprise law, perhaps provides a better refutation. However, the general difficulty of attempting to discern the effects of one provision on an entire economy is exacerbated by India's generally rapid economic growth 172 and liberalisation of other areas of the law, 173 as this may have caused any negative effects of group liability to pale into insignificance. What this does appear to suggest, though, is that the change in the law did not bring the economy of India to its knees. This seems almost too obvious to be worth stating, but it does highlight that, at the very least, under the very limited scope for liability argued for here, non-risky businesses, and even many risky or hazardous businesses will not be deterred from operating. The former will have no cause for concern, beyond speculating that the change in the law will 'open the floodgates' for further changes that may affect them in the future, while most of the latter will be sufficiently cautious regardless of the change, so that they will not fear an accident or its ramifications. Thus focus is returned to the deterrent effect of the change: only the ultra-hazardous and excessively risky ventures will be deterred and any resulting decline in investment, likely to be very small, would, it is argued, be a small price to pay for bringing the present law in line with tort policy.
A contrasting example helpfully illustrates how legal change could affect the economy. When corporate tax was increased, a number of businesses left, or threatened to leave the UK. 174 This is explained by a number of factors; the most important being that this increase applies to far more businesses than the change in the 168 Presser, n 57, 426.
169 Hamilton and Macey, Cases and Materials on Corporations Including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies (West Publishing, 2003) 351. 170 Dearborn, n 50, 215. law presently advocated. A related point is that the corporate tax is not fault-based and therefore a business will be affected regardless of its actions. Yet despite its broad applicability, this 'supertax', 175 has not greatly impacted the UK's economy and, despite there being many threats, the number of companies actually leaving the UK is low.
176 Like the situation in India, the negative effects of the increase in tax are tempered by a number of other factors, thus limiting the overall impact.
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The evidence for concluding that implementing enterprise liability at the intersection of corporate groups and torts would have any more than an imperceptible effect is weak. In sum, it seems difficult to predict exactly what the effects on the investment economy would be, but it seems clear that businesses would be unlikely to exile en masse.
(b) Inevitability of avoidance
One sweeping argument holds that companies will, inevitably, devise schemes for circumventing any new rule that seeks to impose liability on them. In some ways this is a derivative of the contention, discussed below, that the form of enterprise analysis advocated here simply does not go far enough, as unlimited liability for all companies is the only way to ensure that liability will be imposed.
While it certainly seems true that companies will make attempts to circumvent such a rule, this is not a standalone argument for not at least attempting to draft a law that will hold companies liable and attempt to identify companies seeking to circumvent the law. Furthermore, this argument seems to be either naïve or wilfully blind as to the flexible nature of the courts. As the German example shows, the courts can take an active role in ensuring the purpose and spirit of the law is upheld. It seems unthinkable that the courts would allow a company to escape their legal obligations where it has blatantly attempted to circumvent a rule of enterprise liability.
Furthermore, the precise 'knock-on effects' of the law can never be known, and simply enacting a law of enterprise liability may well have positive effects. For instance, a company considering incorporating a subsidiary for the purposes of conducting a hazardous activity and then somehow circumventing the enterprise liability rule may be deterred from doing so simply by the fear that the courts will see through such attempts and hold them liable in spite of the attempted circumvention. At the very least it seems likely that a company would be aware of the high costs of litigation that may be involved in taking this course of action.
Some of the cases already discussed illustrate the power of the law to coerce companies into compliance. In the Thor litigation, one set of claims 178 was settled out of court after the Court merely accepted that they had jurisdiction over the case. 179 Likewise, in the US, the possibility of litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 180 following the rejection of a summary judgment in their favour, 181 led Unocal to settle claims against them for an undisclosed sum. 182 Thus it is postulated that compensation of victims is likely to increase further in these situations under an enterprise liability rule, as companies will be aware that the courts have the ability to hold them liable.
(c) Enterprise liability for torts or unlimited liability?
It may be argued that the application of enterprise liability propounded here does not go far enough, and that parent companies should be liable for all debts of the subsidiary. 183 In focusing on tort victims and the externalisation of risk using subsidiaries, it is possible to become myopic and lose sight of the bigger 175 picture: externalisation of risk is only one of many reasons that a company may wish to incorporate a subsidiary. If unlimited liability were to be imposed as the new paradigm in company law, the myriad of legitimate uses of subsidiaries would be frustrated. There are a number of reasons why a company may incorporate a subsidiary, such as simplification of management and international operations. 184 One US case aptly summarised the issue thus: 'Since society recognizes the benefits of allowing persons and organizations to limit their business risks through incorporation, sound public policy dictates that disregard of those separate corporate entities be approached with caution'.
185
The approach taken in this paper to disregarding limited liability and implementing enterprise liability is very cautious, and would allow liability in very limited circumstances. This balances the legitimate uses of the corporate form with the need to protect tort victims from the ill-considered application of limited liability to the corporate group context. Conversely, unlimited liability would seem to throw caution to the wind, along with the recognised benefits of limited liability.
While there is at least some argument that unlimited liability would not hurt the economy, 186 application of unlimited liability to groups would almost certainly spell the end for conglomerates. Blumberg notes that the reduction of risk is particularly important for conglomerates, corporate groups that own and operate a variety of unrelated business ventures, as it enables them to diversify their business portfolio into previously unexplored areas of business, 187 an action they take on a regular basis by their very nature. In this vein, Hadden states that 'some worthwhile but risky ventures which might be taken by large groups may not be undertaken at all'.
188 Passive corporate investment may also cease, as the risk of liability or the costs of monitoring would likely outweigh the benefits.
While those that advocate unlimited liability as the solution to the externalisation of risk undoubtedly mean well, it is difficult to see how unlimited liability is an improvement on the present law. While tort creditors would indeed be protected, the application of unlimited liability seems only to replace one ill-fitting rule with another. By contrast, enterprise liability, as advocated here, it a much more nuanced solution that neatly fits at the intersection of corporate groups and torts.
(d) Uncertainty of a test for enterprise liability
A common argument made in all areas of the law is that a given test is uncertain and the proposed rule of enterprise liability is no different; 189 it has been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, attacked on the ground that 'measuring the extent of an 'economic unit' introduces an intolerable level of uncertainty into the question of liability '. 190 For their part, a sufficiently diligent legislature could remove some uncertainty with the construction of a sufficiently certain test. Insofar as uncertainty is thought to stem from the inability of the courts to determine the boundaries of an economic entity, it must again be acknowledged that courts regularly apply complex legal standards with little difficulty and there is no reason to think that enterprise analysis would be any different.
In any case, while it is true that any test is likely to be less certain than the current law, which sacrifices suitability and flexibility for certainty, it must be considered whether the benefits of enterprise analysis outweigh any potential uncertainty. Given the minimal level of uncertainty that the test is likely to introduce, enterprise analysis is surely not so uncertain as to outweigh its benefits. If it is accepted, as it is in this paper, that some law should exist to enable an unprotected victim of a tort to recover, then the inevitable introduction of at least some certainty is acceptable as a necessary, albeit minor, evil.
(e) Uncertainty of Goals of Enterprise Liability
184 Douglas and Shanks, 'Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations ' (1929) 39 Yale L J 193. 185 Pacific Landmark Hotel, Ltd. v. Marriott Hotels, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 563 (Ct. App. 1993 ) (US CA) (citation omitted).
186 See and Meiners, Mofsky and Tollinson, n 59. 187 Blumberg, 'Limited Liability', n 6, 624. 188 Hadden, n 18, 281. 189 See Dearborn, n 50, 259. 190 Kors, 'Altered Egos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation' (1998) 59 U of Pittsburgh L Rev 381, 437-8. Sommer 191 has contended that, while enterprise theory is intellectually preferable to entity theory, it suffers from a 'haziness of goals' because 'it is difficult to see why jurisdiction or liability should attach to an active investment and not a passive one'; he calls this an 'enormous flaw '. 192 There is no difficulty in seeing why liability should attach to an active investment and not a passive one. Firstly, in the 'risky business' scenario, the actively invested parent corporation is responsible for the tort as it incorporated a subsidiary precisely for the purposes of externalising the risk that materialised. By contrast, an inactive investor plays no part in such a course of action. Secondly, by virtue of this passivity, an inactive investor is not in a position to oversee the activities of the subsidiary, so applying liability to them will not encourage the pre-emption of torts, whereas the imposition of liability on a parent company is likely, as discussed, to cause greater centralisation of management and greater oversight. Finally, the advantages that arise from limited liability still apply in the case of an inactive investor, so it makes little sense to impose liability on them.
In a similar, though more general, vein, Addo has suggested that '[e]nterprise law needs a clear and distinct rationale to rival the facilitation of entrepreneurial spirit… upon which entity law principles… are built'. 193 Strasser and Blumberg have also noted the need for identification of the 'underlying policies of the law in the specific area of the law at issue'. 194 These commentators have identified the need to ensure a driving rationale for enterprise liability and this need is satisfied by the current proposal. In the conception of enterprise liability proposed here, the principles of tort law are the driving rationale, as enterprise liability would be guided by the need to adequately protect tort victims.
THE REASON FOR INACTION
Given the weight of the arguments for the application of enterprise liability to the risky business situation, it may be asked why this necessary change in the law has been so neglected. In the UK the courts have, at first, played a role developing the law, but have subsequently moved to curtail or eradicate the advancement of enterprise analysis. 195 Why do courts 'remain so willing to provide limited liability to parent corporations in tort cases'? 196 Thompson suggests that one reason is that the risks under discussion are seen as remote, so that even if courts did impose liability in these circumstances, 'no extra preventative actions would be taken '. 197 This explanation is unsatisfactory. Firstly, because many cases involve the use of a subsidiary company precisely to avoid the consequences of risks that they are aware of, as opposed to remote and unforeseen risks, and, secondly, even if imposition of liability would not stop such torts occurring, it would at least allow the courts to redress harm to tort victims.
A much more likely explanation for the courts reluctance is a predisposition of deference to the legislature. Certainly in the UK this explanation is prevalent and has been proffered by the courts on a number of occasions. For instance, in the Salomon case, 198 Lord Davey considered that the legislature may not have considered the possibility of the 'one man company' leaving a defect in the machinery of the Act, but nevertheless he held that the wording decided upon by parliament must stand. 199 Likewise, Lord Halsbury, refusing to go beyond the express words of parliament, noted that '[t]he sole guide must be the statute itself '. 200 In some cases the deference has manifested as a reluctance to make exceptions to the strict rules, 201 while in Adams v Cape, this deference took the form of curtailing existing judicially developed doctrines and severely limiting the scope for future judicial intervention.
Given this deference, the pertinent question is therefore why the legislature has not opted to implement the necessary reform. One reason has been put forward by Hansman and Kramaan. 202 They query why limited liability has been universally accepted as the rule, 203 even in situations where 'normative and economic realities necessitate a different regime of legal inquiry'. 204 They suggest that the answer is obvious: markets and politics do not well represent the interests of the tort victims, who bear the direct costs of the rule. 205 As previously noted, tort creditors cannot contract around limited liability, while, at the same time, tort victims, particularly potential tort victims, owing to their inherently disparate nature, 'do not constitute an easily organized political interest group '. 206 This explanation is disarmingly simple and is supported by experience. In India it was a disaster on a massive scale that was the impetus for reform; an estimated 5,000 people died in the Bhopal disaster, while around 500,000 people were affected overall. 207 Due to this scale, it was not tort victims alone providing the impetus for implementing reform, but a whole nation and its government: 208 'the Bhopal disaster shook off the lethargy of everyone and triggered off a new wave of consciousness'.
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CONCLUSION
This paper started by observing two major problems with the strict application of corporate personality and limited liability at the intersection of corporate groups and torts: the law fails to take a considered approach to corporate groups and it prejudices tort victims. The former arose because the modern phenomenon of corporate groups has been awkwardly squeezed into the concepts of the separate entity and limited liability, apparently without acknowledging that the foundational justifications for those concepts do not apply where two or more companies are one in economic terms. The latter arose because this uncritical acceptance of limited liability meant that the interests of tort victims were not considered.
Despite these beginnings, the strict separation of companies, especially where the tortuous liability of a subsidiary is concerned, has remained fairly consistent, and has been reaffirmed as a cornerstone of UK company law. Yet common sense suggests that retention of the doctrine simply because of its historical roots is a flawed course of action, 210 and this paper has argued that the time for reconsideration and change is long overdue.
The change advocated in this paper is enterprise liability. While as early as 1947 the theory was proposed as an alternative paradigm in company law, 211 the focus of this paper has been the intersection of corporate groups and torts, and the potentially sweeping and revolutionary nature of enterprise theory has been tempered by a narrowing of its application to deal with the two issues identified. This narrowed application of enterprise theory solves the issues discussed by reflecting both the economic realities of modern enterprise and the aims of the law of tort.
Some key considerations to be made when formulating a test for enterprise liability have been suggested and the use of an economics-centred approach has been advocated. A test for enterprise liability would take inspiration from Germany, India, the UN, and Lord Denning's previous attempt to include enterprise principles into UK law and tie enterprise liability to the economic reality. Such a test would look to economic factors, as well as public identification and unity of purpose. The presence of an enterprise liability rule alone would likely cause a gradual shift in corporate attitudes, hopefully reducing the number of tort claims arising. In the meantime tort victims could rely on the direct cause of action accorded to them to 'cut through the layers of risk externalizing subsidiaries' 212 and seek compensation.
Should we wait for a large-scale human tragedy to close this lamentable gap in the law? The answer, it is submitted, is no. It is time to replace the dysfunctional and anachronistic law at the intersection of corporate groups and torts with an appropriate set of rules based on enterprise analysis.
